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NOTES AND COMMENTS

CONFLICT OF LAWS
MUTUAL INSURANCE CONTRACTS
The New York Superintendent of Insurance brought suit in
Georgia to recover assessments levied by order of the New York
Supreme Court against twenty-four Georgia policy holders of an
insolvent New York Mutual Insurance company. The policies did
not provide for such assessments nor refer to the holders as "members"
of a mutual company. Held, defendants were not liable as members 1
In some cases, a contract of insurance has been held to be
governed, as to matters of construction, interpretation, and validity,
by the laws and usages of the place where the contract is made.2
On the other hand, many decisions state that the pertinent law is
determined by the place where the contract is to be performed. 3 An
express statement in the policy,4 the contemplation of the parties,5
or legislation,6 often establishes the rule to be employed. But it
appears settled that contracts of mutual insurance companies are
governed by the law of the domicile of the corporation.7 The Georgia
court in the principal case failed to consider the last mentioned rules
and stated that since no facts were alleged as to the place of making
or performing the contract, the law of the forum should apply.9
An assessment by decree of court such as was made by the
New York court in this case, is conclusive only as to the amount
Pink v. A.A.A. Highway Express, 191 Ga. 502, 13 S. E. (2d) 337
(1941).
- Rosenthal
v. New York Life Insurance Co., 804 U.S. 263 (1938);
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Cohen, 179 U.S. 262 (1900);
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Cohen, 96 F. (2d) 66, 68
(C. C. A. 2nd, 1938). The contract is made where the final act is
performed wich is necessary to its completion
and to make
it
Society
Assurance
more binding on both parties. Equitable Life
v. Clements, 140 U. S. 226 (1891); Wheeler v. Business Men's
Ass'n of America, 247 Fed. 677 (W. D. Mo. 1918); Northwestern
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Elliot, 5 Fed. 225, (C. C. D. Ore.
1880).
Scudder v. Union National Bank, 91 U. S.406 (1875); Davis v. Aetna
Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 67 N. H. 218, 34 At. 464 (1892). The
place of contracting theory is arbitrary, incoherent, and tends to
create uncertainty. The rule abandons the vested right theory
and is not in accord with the actual phenomma of judicial decision. Cook, Contracts and the Conflict of Laws (1936) 31 ILL. L.
REV. 143.
'Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Hill, 193 U. S. 551 (1904); New York
Life Insurance Co. v. Dodge, 246 U. S. 357 (1918).
5Eagle v. New York Life Insurance Co., 48 Ind. App. 284, 91 N. E.
814 (1910).
8 Fidelity Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Miazza, 93 Miss. 18, 46 So.
817 (1908).
Supreme Council of Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U. S. 531 (1915)
s Pink v. A. A. A. Highway Express, 191 Ga. 502, 514, 13 S. E. (2d)
337, 344 (1941).
Scudder v. Union National Bank, 91 U. S. 406 (1875); BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS

(1935) § 311.1.
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of and the necessity for an assessment. 10 Here the Georgia court
did not deny the conclusiveness of the decree of the New York court,
although it did fail to use the law of New York to determine the
contract questions involved."
Thus by application of the Georgia contract law, the policy
holders were held not to be members of the New York mutual insurance company 12 and obviously the decree was not binding on those
who were not members. The case seems justifiable, for it is highly
probable that the same result would have been attained if the correct
13
law, namely that of the domicile of the corporation, had been applied.

CORPORATIONS
CONTRACT BY OUTSIDERS TO INFLUENCE DIRECTORS' ACTION
Plaintiff seeks damages for breach of agreement by influential
business men. The defendants for a good consideration promised to
present plaintiff's name to the Board of Directors of Reo Motor
Corporation and urge that he be offered a position as manager. None
of the parties to the contract was alleged to be a stockholder in
the corporation. It was alleged that the plan was in the best interests of the corporation and that because of defendant's breach,
plaintiff was not offered a position. Held, demurrer overruled. The
contract is not against public policy.,
As alleged, the defendants possessed sufficient influence to control the directors in exercising their judgment on corporate matters.
Logically, public policy toward their contracts would be the same as
that governing validity of directors' contracts. As a general rule
directors owe a duty to the corporation to exercise individually and
at the appointed time their best and impartial judgment on behalf
of the corporation. 2 Stockholders likewise are not permitted to
bind the directors in the exercise of this duty. 3 After acknowledging
such a duty, the court asserts that it is not here in question as the
defendants were not directors or stockholders. The court then analogizes the contract in the principal case to those made by directors
lo Chandler v. Peketz, 297 U. S. 609 (1936); Selig v. Hamilton, 234
U. S. 652 (1914); Swing v. Humbird, 94 Minn. 1, 101 N. W. 938
(1904); Stone v. Penn Yan, K. P. & B. Ry., 197 N. Y. 279, 90
N. E. 843 (1910). However, personal defenses may be asserted,
if not in the nature of a collateral attack.
" Supreme Council of Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U. S. 531 (1915);
Sliosburg v. New York Life Ins. Co., 244 N. Y. 482, 155 N. E. 749
(1927).
12 The somewhat
questionable rule employed by the court was expressed in WHARTON, CONFLICT OF LAWS (3d ed. 1905)

§ 401.

"'New York Life Ins. Co. v. Street, 265 S. V. 397, 403 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1924).
1 Miller v. Vanderlip, 285 N.Y. 116, 33 N.E. (2d) 51 (1941).
2 West v. Camden, 135 U.S. 507 (1890) ; 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev.

ed. 1938) §1737; 2 FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS (Perm. ed. 1931) §280.

'McQuade

v. Stoneham, 263 N.Y. 323, 189 N.E. 234 (1934),

44 YALE Ls. 873.

(1935)

